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 In re Resort at Summerlin Litigation, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 15, 127 P.3d 1076, 
(Feb. 9, 2006)1 
 
PROPERTY – LIEN PRIORITY & RECOVERY OF LITIGATION COSTS 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal and cross-appeal from a district court order granting a holder of a deed of trust 
priority over holders of mechanic’s liens but denying deed of trust holder’s request for costs.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed.  A holder of a deed of trust who records first maintains priority over holders of 
mechanic’s liens when the deed of trust holder does not elect to be bound by NRS Chapter 106.  
A deed of trust holder may not recover costs under NRS 108.239(6) and 108.237(3) since the 
statutes apply only to lien claimants.       
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In December 1997, The Resort at Summerlin, Inc. (Resort) contracted with J.A. Jones 
Construction Company (Jones) to construct a five-star casino property in Las Vegas.  
Wilmington Trust Company (Wilmington) acted as lead agent and holder of the deed of trust for 
the various lenders.  The deed of trust was signed on December 31, 1997, and recorded January 
2, 1998.   
 Work began on the project in January 1998.  Disputes then arose between the Resort and 
Jones over change orders and construction schedules.  Jones and others then filed mechanic’s 
liens against the property and eventually sought foreclosure of their liens in district court.  In 
November 2000, the district court action was suspended when the Resort filed Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings.   
 On January 31, 2001, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay so that the state 
district court could determine the priority of the future advances under Wilmington’s deed of 
trust against several mechanic’s lien claimants.  The district court ruled that NRS 106.3602 was a 
“safe harbor” statute that a party must elect to be bound by.  Since Wilmington did not elect to be 
bound by the statute, the district court ruled that common law applied.  After a bench trial, the 
district court ruled that Wilmington’s entire deed of trust had priority over the mechanic’s liens 
since Wilmington recorded its deed of trust first.   
 After the court entered its judgment, it held a hearing on Wilmington’s motion for costs.  
The district court indicated that NRS Chapter 108, rather than NRS Chapter 18, controlled the 
award of costs in this matter and interpreted Chapter 108 to allow a cost award only for a lien 
claimant.  Since Wilmington was not a lien claimant, the court denied its request for costs.   
 Jones and other lien claimants appealed the district court’s priority determination, and 
Wilmington appealed the costs determination.   
                                                 
1 By Bryan Lindsey 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 106.360 (2003).   
  
Discussion 
 
Priority Determination 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court first determined that NRS 106.360 did not set forth 
mandatory requirements for future advance instruments.3  Furthermore, NRS 106.350 clearly 
states that if a party desires to opt-in to the safe harbor provisions of NRS 106.300 to NRS 
106.400, that party must expressly state that it is governed by the statutory scheme.4  Since 
Wilmington’s deed of trust documents failed to reference NRS Chapter 106, the deed of trust 
was not subject to its provisions.   
 Since the statute did not apply, the court looked to the common law to evaluate the 
priority issue.  Under common law principles, obligatory future advances “date back to the 
original date of recordation.”5  Here, the language from the deed of trust when combined with the 
credit agreement clearly demonstrated that the advances were obligatory.  Therefore, the court 
held that the district court did not err in determining that Wilmington’s deed of trust advances  
maintained priority over the mechanic’s lien claimants.   
 
Costs under NRS Chapter 108 
 
 NRS Chapter 18 allows for the prevailing party in an action to be awarded its costs.6  
However, NRS 108.239(6), although similar to NRS Chapter 18, more specifically refers to lien 
claimants.7  The court determined that where a general statutory provision and a specific 
provision cover the same subject matter, the specific provision controls.8  Thus, the more specific 
statute, NRS 108.239(6), controls over the more general provisions of NRS Chapter 18.  Since 
Wilmington is the representative of deed of trust lenders and not a lien claimant, the court held 
that it may not recover costs under NRS 108.239(6).  Therefore, the district court did not err in 
denying the costs requested by Wilmington.   
 Additionally, Wilmington argued that it should be awarded attorney fees pursuant to NRS 
108.237(3).9  However, the statute provides for fees in the context of representation of a lien 
                                                 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 106.360 provides for the execution, contents and amendment of an instrument that encumbers 
real property as security for future advances:  
1.  A borrower may execute an instrument encumbering his real property to secure future advances from a 
lender within a mutually agreed maximum amount of principal.   
 2.  The instrument must state clearly:  
  (a) That is secures future advances; and  
  (b) The maximum amount of principal to be secured.   
3.  The maximum amount of advances of principal to be secured by the instrument may increase or 
decrease from time to time by amendment or the instrument.   
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 106.350 states that the provisions “apply only to an instrument or supplement or amendment to 
an instrument that states clearly that it is to be governed by those provisions.”   
5 Southern Trust v. K & B Door Co., 104 Nev. 564, 566 n. 1, 763 P.2d 353, 354 n. 1 (1988).   
6 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 18.005–18.180.    
7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.239(6).   
8 Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty, 115 Nev. 353, 364, 989 P.2d 870, 877 (1999).   
9 NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.237(3).   
 claimant, which Wilmington is not.  Therefore, the court held the district court properly refused 
to award attorney fees to Wilmington.   
 
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions 
 
HARDESTY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
 Justice Hardesty concurred in the majority’s decision on the priority of Wilmington’s 
deed of trust, but dissented from the denial of Wilmington’s cost award.  He argued that a lien 
priority dispute between mechanic’s lien claimants and the holder of a deed of trust is ancillary 
and distinct from the priority determination contemplated by the mechanic’s lien statutes.10  
Thus, NRS Chapter 108 did not apply and Wilmington should have been awarded costs under 
NRS Chapter 18.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The court affirmed the district court’s finding that in order to be bound by NRS Chapter 
106, a party’s written instrument must expressly state its intention to be bound by the statute.  
Since Wilmington’s deed of trust did not do so, common law applied.  The court then found that 
under common law, Wilmington’s deed of trust advances maintained priority over the 
mechanic’s lien claimants because it was recorded first.  The court also affirmed the district 
court’s denial of costs to Wilmington.  The court concluded that Wilmington was not entitled to 
recover costs under NRS 108.239(6) or attorney fees under NRS 108.237(3) because Wilmington 
was not a lien claimant.   
 
    
 
                                                 
10 See A.F. Construction Co. v. Virgin River Casino, 118 Nev. 699, 705, 56 P.3d 887, 891 (2002).   
